EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW
A series of terrorist attacks in Benghazi, Libya, on September 11-12,
2012, resulted in the deaths of four U.S. government personnel,
Ambassador Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty;
seriously wounded two other U.S. personnel and injured three Libyan
contract guards; and resulted in the destruction and abandonment of the
U.S. Special Mission compound and Annex.
FINDINGS
In examining the circumstances of these attacks, the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi determined that:
- The
attacks were security related, involving arson, small arms and
machine gun fire, and the use of RPGs, grenades, and mortars against
U.S. personnel at two separate facilities—the SMC and the Annex—and en
route between them. Responsibility for the tragic loss of life,
injuries, and damage to U.S. facilities and property rests solely and
completely with the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks. The Board
concluded that there was no protest prior to the attacks, which were
unanticipated in their scale and intensity.
- Systemic
failures and leadership and management deficiencies at senior levels
within two bureaus of the State Department (the "Department") resulted
in a Special Mission security posture that was inadequate for Benghazi
and grossly inadequate to deal with the attack that took place.
Security in Benghazi was not recognized and implemented as a
"shared responsibility" by the bureaus in Washington charged with
supporting the post, resulting in stove-piped discussions and decisions
on policy and security. That said, Embassy Tripoli did not demonstrate
strong and sustained advocacy with Washington for increased security
for Special Mission Benghazi.
The short-term,
transitory nature of Special Mission Benghazi's staffing, with talented
and committed, but relatively inexperienced, American personnel often
on temporary assignments of 40 days or less, resulted in diminished
institutional knowledge, continuity, and mission capacity.
Overall, the number of Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS)
security staff in Benghazi on the day of the attack and in the months
and weeks leading up to it was inadequate, despite repeated requests
from Special Mission Benghazi and Embassy Tripoli for additional
staffing. Board members found a pervasive realization among personnel
who served in Benghazi that the Special Mission was not a high priority
for Washington when it came to security-related requests, especially
those relating to staffing.
The insufficient
Special Mission security platform was at variance with the appropriate
Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB) standards with respect to
perimeter and interior security. Benghazi was also severely
under-resourced with regard to certain needed security equipment,
although DS funded and installed in 2012 a number of physical security
upgrades. These included heightening the outer perimeter wall, safety
grills on safe area egress windows, concrete jersey barriers, manual
drop-arm vehicle barriers, a steel gate for the Villa C safe area, some
locally manufactured steel doors, sandbag fortifications, security
cameras, some additional security lighting, guard booths, and an
Internal Defense Notification System.
Special
Mission Benghazi's uncertain future after 2012 and its "non-status" as
a temporary, residential facility made allocation of resources for
security and personnel more difficult, and left responsibility to meet
security standards to the working-level in the field, with very limited
resources.
In the weeks and months leading up to the
attacks, the response from post, Embassy Tripoli, and Washington to a
deteriorating security situation was inadequate. At the same time, the
SMC's dependence on the armed but poorly skilled Libyan February 17
Martyrs' Brigade (February 17) militia members and unarmed, locally
contracted Blue Mountain Libya (BML) guards for security support was
misplaced.he February 17 militia had proven effective in responding to
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks on the Special Mission in
April and June 2012, there were some troubling indicators of its
reliability in the months and weeks preceding the September attacks. At
the time of Ambassador Stevens' visit, February 17 militia members had
stopped accompanying Special Mission vehicle movements in protest over
salary and working hours.
Post and the Department
were well aware of the anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks but at no time were there ever any specific, credible threats
against the mission in Benghazi related to the September 11
anniversary. Ambassador Stevens and Benghazi-based DS agents had taken
the anniversary into account and decided to hold all meetings
on-compound on September 11.
The Board found that
Ambassador Stevens made the decision to travel to Benghazi
independently of Washington, per standard practice. Timing for his trip
was driven in part by commitments in Tripoli, as well as a staffing
gap between principal officers in Benghazi. Plans for the Ambassador's
trip provided for minimal close protection security support and were
not shared thoroughly with the Embassy's country team, who were not
fully aware of planned movements off compound. The Ambassador did not
see a direct threat of an attack of this nature and scale on the U.S.
Mission in the overall negative trendline of security incidents from
spring to summer 2012. His status as the leading U.S. government
advocate on Libya policy, and his expertise on Benghazi in particular,
caused Washington to give unusual deference to his judgments.
Communication, cooperation, and coordination among Washington,
Tripoli, and Benghazi functioned collegially at the working-level but
were constrained by a lack of transparency, responsiveness, and
leadership at the senior levels. Among various Department bureaus and
personnel in the field, there appeared to be very real confusion over
who, ultimately, was responsible and empowered to make decisions based
on both policy and security considerations.
- Notwithstanding
the proper implementation of security systems and procedures and
remarkable heroism shown by American personnel, those systems and the
Libyan response fell short in the face of a series of attacks that
began with the sudden penetration of the Special Mission compound by
dozens of armed attackers.
The Board found the
responses by both the BML guards and February 17 to be inadequate. The
Board's inquiry found little evidence that the armed February 17 guards
offered any meaningful defense of the SMC, or succeeded in summoning a
February 17 militia presence to assist expeditiously.
The Board found the Libyan government's response to be profoundly
lacking on the night of the attacks, reflecting both weak capacity and
near absence of central government influence and control in Benghazi.
The Libyan government did facilitate assistance from a
quasi-governmental militia that supported the evacuation of U.S.
government personnel to Benghazi airport. The Libyan government also
provided a military C-130 aircraft which was used to evacuate remaining
U.S. personnel and the bodies of the deceased from Benghazi to Tripoli
on September 12.
The Board determined that U.S.
personnel on the ground in Benghazi performed with courage and
readiness to risk their lives to protect their colleagues, in a near
impossible situation. The Board members believe every possible effort
was made to rescue and recover Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith.
The interagency response was timely and appropriate, but there
simply was not enough time for armed U.S. military assets to have made a
difference.
- The Board found that
intelligence provided no immediate, specific tactical warning of the
September 11 attacks. Known gaps existed in the intelligence
community's understanding of extremist militias in Libya and the
potential threat they posed to U.S. interests, although some threats
were known to exist.
- The Board found that
certain senior State Department officials within two bureaus
demonstrated a lack of proactive leadership and management ability in
their responses to security concerns posed by Special Mission Benghazi,
given the deteriorating threat environment and the lack of reliable
host government protection. However, the Board did not find reasonable
cause to determine that any individual U.S. government employee
breached his or her duty.
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Accountability Review Board for Benghazi: Unclassified report (2012) |
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